{"id":84370,"date":"2023-09-12T17:00:00","date_gmt":"2023-09-12T14:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/?p=84370"},"modified":"2025-09-12T16:57:12","modified_gmt":"2025-09-12T13:57:12","slug":"the-metaphysical-juice-of-virtual-apples-what-contemporary-philosophers-think-about-vr","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/the-metaphysical-juice-of-virtual-apples-what-contemporary-philosophers-think-about-vr\/","title":{"rendered":"The Metaphysical Juice of Virtual Apples: What Contemporary Philosophers Think About VR"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cVirtual reality is indeed real, and all events that occur within it are not merely an illusion.\u201d Such is the conclusion reached today by several well-known thinkers. From their point of view, virtual objects can perform the same social functions as physical ones, evoke the same experiences in us, and therefore be no less valuable. Yet not all developers and media theorists agree with these claims. Philosopher Alexandra Tanyushina analyses why the status of digital spaces provokes so much debate among researchers and why in general one should study virtual reality.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"The
Frame from Werner Herzog Fassbinder\u2019s World on a Wire (1973). Data: IMDb<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

VR in Culture<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Research into virtual objects is by no means a new strand in the humanities. It is worth recalling that the Latin word virtualis<\/span> appears in philosophical and religious texts from the early Middle Ages. It was understood that some phenomena can exist virtually, that is, in potential, and yet be absent in the actual world. Later, in the High Renaissance, the term was used to describe certain stylistic devices in painting (the so\u2011called \u201ctrompe-l\u2019oeil\u201d), provoking a particular illusion of perception, by which the viewer saw realistic, almost tangible objects that were, in fact, only artistic images. In the 20th century, virtuality would be regularly mentioned in the works of Henri Bergson, Charles S. Peirce, Gilles Deleuze<\/a>, Jean Baudrillard and other philosophers.<\/p>\n

By the end of the century this notion takes on the meaning most familiar to contemporary people, linked to computer technologies that give the user a sense of immersive immersion in a digital environment. Alongside their appearance in mass culture, science-fiction<\/a> plots gain popularity, describing various virtual cyber-spaces. Primarily these are literary works: \u201cThe Man Who Awoke\u201d by Lawrence Manning, \u201cNeuromancer\u201d by William Gibson, and the novels of Stanis\u0142aw Lem, in which the Polish writer describes VR using the term \u201cphantomatica.\u201d Parallelly, cinema in the cyberpunk genre emerges (for instance, the two-part film by German director Rainer Werner Fassbinder, \u201cWorld on a Wire\u201d (1973), which anticipated many ideas and images of the Matrix trilogy).<\/p>\n

Futurists\u2019 musings oscillated between extreme techno-utopianism and radical cyber-pessimism, often taking the form of thought experiments. A notable example is Robert Nozick\u2019s \u201cexperience machine,\u201d described in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia<\/em>. The experiment boils down to one simple question.<\/p>\n

Suppose that, via a device called the \u201cexperience machine,\u201d you could be connected to a perfectly generated virtual reality that would provide you with an endless stream of positive experiences. In that case, what would be the probability that you would actually plug into that artificial environment instead of continuing to live in the ordinary, physical reality?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nozick is himself inclined to think you would opt out. It seems to us subconsciously that existence in such a reality would not be full: we would not be able to interact with the world and with other people, and we would have good reason to doubt the reliability of our experiences. We would also be deterred by the thought that if the \u201cexperience machine\u201d were suddenly turned off, we might lose access to our virtual property or even die.<\/p>\n

Such reasoning undoubtedly rests on the familiar dichotomy of digits and matter, which leads us automatically to think that any virtuality is, by definition, fictitious. Yet not all researchers share this conclusion. Thus the concept of virtual realism arose.<\/p>\n

What is real in VR?<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In 2000 American philosopher Michael Heim published a book with the concise, but far from unambiguous, title \u201cVirtual Realism<\/a>.\u201d Citing the famous Heideggerian thesis that \u201ctechnology is neither good nor evil, nor is it neutral,\u201d Heim sought to narrow the rift between humans and our digital technologies: since it is no longer possible to remove computers from daily life, we should learn to perceive them as an indispensable condition of our existence. The upshot: VR devices are already intruding into our \u201creality,\u201d and we should stop treating them as just another science-fiction trope.<\/p>\n

From this point the problem of the reality of virtual spaces is taken seriously by researchers. Thus American philosopher Philip Brey asks: can one assert that some virtual objects, actions or events are part of the real world? We usually rarely dwell on this, because we have long been accustomed to the idea that some familiar phenomena can be reproduced in digitised form.<\/p>\n

Virtual money, banks, contracts and other social objects whose existence and functioning are secured by conditional agreement among members of society are, in essence, as real as their material counterparts, and, consequently, may exert the same influence on the physical world.<\/strong><\/p>\n

To this one can add certain objects whose essence is defined not so much by their material properties as by their functional qualities. For example, a digital calculator installed on a computer or a smartphone seems just as real as a conventional analogue device.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Until recently, most philosophical texts on VR were devoted to such considerations of the social role of digital spaces. But today the phrase \u201cvirtual realism\u201d is taking on quite different colours.<\/p>\n

Escaping the \u201cmetaphysical trap\u201d, or Why VR matters to philosophers<\/strong><\/h2>\n

\u201cVirtual reality is merely another artistic medium, or more precisely a convincing image into which we want to believe,\u201d writes Grant Tavinor in his 2021 book The Aesthetics of Virtual Reality<\/a>. From his standpoint, VR is not much different from classical screen media, which create dynamic images of fictional objects, thereby triggering the sense of their physical presence. Just as the Lumi\u00e8re brothers\u2019 famous \u201cArrival of a Train at La Ciotica Station\u201d purportedly frightened viewers, VR is simply the result of projecting a flat scene according to the laws of artistic perspective. The difference is that VR presents this to the viewer via stereoscopic display based on binocular vision. This immersion and interactivity are what make the illusion of the realism of digital images so convincing.<\/p>\n

From such reasoning, Grant Tavinor makes a simple deduction: the notion of the \u201creality of virtual reality\u201d is merely a mistake in our philosophical thinking that arose from insufficient study of the expressive properties of so\u2011called post\u2011screen media, to which VR systems belong. Once we understand how such interactive digital environments influence our perception and behavior, there will be no need to treat them as if they exist in reality. Of course, nothing prevents us from continuing to construct various digital \u043e\u043d\u0442\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0438<\/span>, thereby squeezing the \u201cmetaphysical juice from virtual fruits.\u201d However, at this stage of our technological development, it is much more pressing to address other problems arising in VR research.<\/p>\n

But if pondering the fundamental basis of digital spaces is not the point, what then might interest contemporary thinkers? This is answered in detail by American philosopher Thomas Metzinger in his nearly\u2011titled article \u201cWhat makes virtual reality interesting for philosophers?<\/a>\u201d and Maltese philosopher Stefano Gualeni, author of the book Virtual Worlds as Philosophical Tools: How to Philosophize with a Digital Hammer<\/a>. The researchers show that artificial digital spaces provide a wonderful way to realise a multitude of philosophical thought experiments\u2014from the Twin Earth thought experiment<\/a> and the brain in a vat<\/a> of Hilary Putnam to the the simulation hypothesis<\/a> of Nick Bostrom or the Chinese room<\/a> by John Searle. With virtual environments it is easy to model fictitious scenarios of future development and various branches of alternate history, as well as to program and visualise worlds based on entirely different fundamental physical constants<\/a>. In addition, artificial realities provide a useful gno\u00adseological<\/span> instrument through which contemporary thinkers can better understand what we mean by such a concept as \u201cknowledge.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"The
Album cover of II \/ Band Dughpa. Data: Bandcamp<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Development of virtual reality has prompted a reevaluation of some theories of consciousness. For a long time in philosophy and cognitive science the \u201ccomputer metaphor\u201d of thinking \u2014 the brain as a biological computing device \u2014 was widely used. Today the so-called \u201cvirtual metaphor\u201d is increasingly mentioned, devoted to analysis of digital immortality, digital identity, virtual embodiment, and so on.<\/p>\n

The creation of VR devices and their active use in everyday life invites the construction of new legal and ethical systems to regulate behaviour in virtual environments. Together with programmers and developers, contemporary philosophers describe norms for the creation of digital products. For example, American researcher Matthew Cotton in his works<\/a> emphasizes that virtual objects by virtue of their realism are an effective instrument of manipulating engaged users; this, in turn, obliges us to think now about what content is permissible in digital spaces. Consecutive ethical codes<\/a> for the governance of VR- and AR-environments are actively being developed by specialists.<\/p>\n

Finally, virtual reality can be regarded as a convenient metaphilosophical<\/a> instrument because the need to search for new methods of analysing digital worlds often forces us to rethink classical approaches by which we ordinarily philosophise about everyday reality.<\/p>\n

Thus VR is not merely a popular computer technology but a useful theoretical model that catalyses many contemporary philosophical discussions and various interdisciplinary studies. And even if virtual apples are not real entities, that does not mean they cannot land on a scientist\u2019s head, provoking a loud cry of \u201cEureka!\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Alexandra Tanyushina explains why the status of digital spaces is so hotly debated among media theorists and why we should study virtual reality at all.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":84371,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"select":"1","news_style_id":"1","cryptorium_level":"","_short_excerpt_text":"","creation_source":"","_metatest_mainpost_news_update":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1144],"tags":[1361,1366],"class_list":["post-84370","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-longreads","tag-virtual-world-innovations","tag-vr-ar"],"aioseo_notices":[],"amp_enabled":true,"views":"22","promo_type":"1","layout_type":"1","short_excerpt":"","is_update":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/84370","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=84370"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/84370\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":84372,"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/84370\/revisions\/84372"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/84371"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=84370"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=84370"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/forklog.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=84370"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}